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Abstract   “Crackland”, located in the heart of Sao Paulo, is Brazil’s most long-
standing open drugs scene, where crack cocaine users settled and where violence 
spread for the past two decades. This paper seeks to analyze the paradoxical 
mechanisms adopted by policymakers and law enforcement in the city of Sao Paulo 
that led Crackland and problems stemming from its very existence to root and 
persist. First, this paper introduces an overview of the current Crackland landscape 
and failed attempts to deal with it. Then, it relates that to a rooted history of war on 
drugs in the city and in Brazil as driving forces undermining progressive and 
internationally recognized approaches to dealing with illegal drug usage. An 
example of promising policy, the Open Arms program, suffered from the lack 
authorities’ capabilities to steer the program and stumbled upon conflicting 
legislation before it was declared to be dismantled. Subsequently, ways to improve 
the program under the current policy framework will be analyzed through 
international best practices in law and drugs policies. 
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Crackland: symbol of Brazil’s drug policy failure 
 
Fig 1. Crackland's region, located in the heart of São Paulo, Brazil. 1 
 
In the heart of São Paulo, Brazil’s largest and richest city, stands 
what has been known by any paulistano as “Cracolândia” —or 
“Crackland”, Brazil’s most long-lived open drugs scene.2 Near Luz, a 
symbolic train station, passengers face a scene of misery: garbage is 
scattered over and around pavements, many falling-apart tents hide 
                                                        
1 Crackland, June 9, 2017, São Paulo, in Government of the State of São 
Paulo, by Alexandre Carvalho / Government of the State of São Paulo, 
June 9, 2017, accessed December 12, 2017, 
http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/pesquisa-pioneira-revela-o-
perfil-dos-frequentadores-da-cracolandia/. 
2 Sam Cowie, “Inside Crackland: The Open-Air Drug Market That São 




facades, aimless people are seen, wandering here and there; some of 
them passengers; hundreds of them crack cocaine takers.3 The police 
force is always around but never there, and what concerns them is not 
crack cocaine usage, but an unpredictable possibility that crack users 
will resort to violence at any moment to exchange products for drugs 
on the streets. 
Every once in a while, there are crackdowns, publicly released as 
positive achievements by São Paulo’s state Secretary of Social 
Development,4 but there are also conflicting findings being published 
at the same time showing that crackdowns haven’t been effective 
enough to dismantle the most popular open drug scene in the city.5 
                                                        
3 Sam Cowie, “Inside Crackland: The Open-Air Drug Market That São 
Paulo Just Can’t Kick,” The Guardian, November 27, 2017, sec. Cities, 
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/nov/27/inside-crackland-
open-air-crack-market-sao-paulo. 
4 A recent one, that took place in May aiming at terminating Crackland, 
for instance, has publicized that more than 50 people were taken into 
custody, but it neglects the fact that Crackland is still there: “Denarc 
presents assessment of megaoperation in Crackland,” Governo do Es-
tado de São Paulo, May 23, 2017, 
http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/denarc-apresenta-balanco-
da-megaoperacao-realizada-na-cracolandia/. 
5 Sam Cowie, “Inside Crackland: The Open-Air Drug Market That São 




The last one was in May 20176, but Crackland resisted and it is still 
there —and for more than 20 years.7 
What was taken for a great success became a reason for public 
embarrassment a month after May’s crackdown, in June 2017. The 
same Secretary of Social Development then released a comprehensive 
study about Crackland —the report was made with the United Nations 
Development Program—, showing that the size of the issue in São 
Paulo has been underestimated; the often repressive response has, like 
others in the past, fallen into inefficacy: not only did the place’s 
population jumped by 180% in a year at Crackland, from 709 people 
to 1.861, but the number of women settling at Crackland increased 
five folds, to a rampant 642 frequenters in the same period.8 
These numbers may have shocked supporters of repressive 
methods against crack users in Crackland. But it didn’t surprise 
anyone used to recognize a fact: the place has become the country’s 
biggest symbol of failure in dealing with crack cocaine. 
The reason why Crackland is still there derives from a paradoxical 
combination of methods in tackling drug usage there. Even though 
new progressive forces informing the public debate about drugs using 
scientific evidence have grown wider and louder in the country in the 
last years—encouraging the establishment of new harm reduction 
policies—, Brazil still has a prohibitionist “War on Drugs” policy 
                                                        
6 “Denarc presents assessment of megaoperation in Crackland,” Gov-
erno do Estado de São Paulo, May 23, 2017, 
http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/denarc-apresenta-balanco-
da-megaoperacao-realizada-na-cracolandia/. 
7 Marcelo Ribeiro et al., “The Brazilian ‘Cracolândia’ Open Drug Scene 
and the Challenge of Implementing a Comprehensive and Effective Drug 
Policy: Editorial,” Addiction 111, no. 4 (April 2016): 571–73, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/add.13151. 
8 Government of the State of São Paulo, ed., “Profile of drug users at 





approach, based on an ambiguous legislation, that combines 
repression by the police forces with punishment for drug users and 
dealers.9 
That led the program under the label harm reduction to address 
Crackland’s issues, known as “Open Arms”—implemented by São 
Paulo’s City— to be modest in design (but ambitious in goals), 
lacking some of the best practices found in similar projects on 
responding to open drug scenes, as those implemented in Canada and 
European cities. The latter examples included in their responses not 
only the need of giving users a crack use kit, but they were also 
thought to be a multi-sector policy combining harm reduction with 
law enforcement.10 
The problem goes beyond that. Open Arms suffer from 
inconsistency in its implementation. As long as critiques—normally 
from conservative movements—emerge, some of its policy 
components get at stake. The reason is simple. Brazil’s policymakers 
are highly sensitive to conservative movements’ criticisms when the 
first signs of failure of a progressive approach toward drugs are 
highlighted by the media. That’s crucial because it impedes any 
critical, serious, and accurate evaluation of a policy response — and 
put solutions at risk to properly handle Crackland. And the current 
legislation on drugs has a key role in supporting such evasive political 
responses. 
A history of War on Drugs 
According to an extensive account of Brazil’s drug policy history, 
the country has followed the drug regime worldwide and the 
American “War on Drugs” approach since the middle of the last 
                                                        
9 Thiago Rodrigues and Beatriz Caiuby Labate, “Brazilian Drug Policy: 
Tension Between Repression and Alternatives,” SpringerLink, 2016, 187–
208, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29082-9_11. 
10 Helge Waal et al., “Open Drug Scenes: Responses of Five European 
Cities,” BMC Public Health 14 (August 16, 2014): 853, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-14-853. 
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century, adopting local policies, such as the “Toxics Law” in 1976, 
that not only mirrored the prohibitionist approach but also established 
heavier penalties for drug users involved in criminal activities.11 The 
more prohibitionist approach was later boosted by the military 
dictatorship in Brazil — from 1964 to 1985— using as an argument 
the need of a moral regeneration of the country’s population in 
response to a more progressive wave started by vocal opponents of 
the dictatorship.12  
The possession of any illegal drugs was forbidden, therefore 
keeping consumers as criminals.13 In 2006, a promising new law on 
drugs came into force, but it was limited in theory and scope and had 
controversial points: drug users would not, technically, commit a legal 
offense if possessing any amount of illegal psychoactive, whereas the 
penalties for drug trafficking would be harsher —for dealing, it 
increased minimum sentences from 3 to 5 years in prison.14  
In reality, however, the practices would remain the same as before, 
as the new law didn’t bring any clarity in making a distinction 
                                                        
11 Thiago Rodrigues and Beatriz Caiuby Labate, “Brazilian Drug Policy: 
Tension Between Repression and Alternatives,” SpringerLink, 2016, 187–
208, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29082-9_11. 
12 Thiago Rodrigues and Beatriz Caiuby Labate, “Brazilian Drug Policy: 
Tension Between Repression and Alternatives,” SpringerLink, 2016, 187–
208, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29082-9_11. 
13 Thiago Rodrigues and Beatriz Caiuby Labate, “Brazilian Drug Policy: 
Tension Between Repression and Alternatives,” SpringerLink, 2016, 187–
208, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29082-9_11. 
14 Luciana Boiteux, “Drugs and Prisons: The Repression of Drugs and 
the Increase of the Brazilian Penitentiary Population,” Systems Over-
load-Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America. Amsterdam/Washington: 
Transnational Institute/Washington Office Latin America, 2011, 30–8. 
Also see: Thiago Rodrigues and Beatriz Caiuby Labate, “Brazilian Drug 
Policy: Tension Between Repression and Alternatives,” SpringerLink, 
2016, 187–208, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29082-9_11. 
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between drug dealers and drug users.15 The criminalization is indeed 
an adverse reality. A study has given plenty of evidence that Brazil’s 
repressive law enforcement practices on drugs contributed to boosting 
the country’s prison population in the last two decades.16 According 
to Brazil’s latest comprehensive report on prisons, of 2014, about 600 
thousand people were in jail, of which 40% were pretrial detainees.17 
The same report says that almost 30% of the prisons’ population was 
charged with drug trafficking. 
Eventually, the new law ended up favoring the criminalization: the 
decision of making a distinction between “drug user” and “drug 
dealer” would be left for the traditionally repressive police force when 
reporting a detainee, and it would be later confirmed by judges 
handling such cases.18 Their strategy was selective: black, poor, and 
marginalized people would be the ones charged with drug 
                                                        
15 Luciana Boiteux, “Drugs and Prisons: The Repression of Drugs and 
the Increase of the Brazilian Penitentiary Population,” Systems Over-
load-Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America. Amsterdam/Washington: 
Transnational Institute/Washington Office Latin America, 2011, 30–8. 
16 Luciana Boiteux, “Drugs and Prisons: The Repression of Drugs and 
the Increase of the Brazilian Penitentiary Population,” Systems Over-
load-Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America. Amsterdam/Washington: 
Transnational Institute/Washington Office Latin America, 2011, 30–8. 
17 Eline Caldas, “MJ releases new report on Brazilian prison’s popula-
tion,” Multimidia, accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.jus-
tica.gov.br/radio/mj-divulga-novo-relatorio-sobre-populacao-car-
ceraria-brasileira. 
18 Thiago Rodrigues and Beatriz Caiuby Labate, “Brazilian Drug Policy: 
Tension Between Repression and Alternatives,” SpringerLink, 2016, 187–
208, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29082-9_11. 
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trafficking—overcrowding prisons—with the government failing to 
control for supply or demand of illegal drugs.19 
Numbers are rare and perhaps inaccurate, but Brazil is possibly one 
of the largest markets for crack cocaine in the world.20 The most 
extensive survey on the matter was published in 2014 by the Ministry 
of Health of Brazil in association with a local institution. It has shown 
that, in 2012— when the survey was conducted—, about 366 
thousand people used crack regularly in all of the country’s capitals.21 
The same report says that in Brazil’s capitals, 1.000 people did illicit 
drugs regularly in the previous six months. Thus, more than a third 
did crack. 
New organizations devoted to advocating for more evidence-based 
polices on drugs emerged in the country in the last years to give some 
balance to the discussion, such as the Brazilian Drug Policy 
Platform22. It aggregated other drug policy institutes born in the 
2000s, a period in which new progressive bills on drugs came out and 
are in debate in the country’s federal legislative houses.23 That helped 
                                                        
19 Luciana Boiteux, “Drugs and Prisons: The Repression of Drugs and 
the Increase of the Brazilian Penitentiary Population,” Systems Over-
load-Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America. Amsterdam/Washington: 
Transnational Institute/Washington Office Latin America, 2011, 30–8. 
20 Marcelo Ribeiro et al., “The Brazilian ‘Cracolândia’ Open Drug Scene 
and the Challenge of Implementing a Comprehensive and Effective Drug 
Policy: Editorial,” Addiction 111, no. 4 (April 2016): 571–73, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/add.13151. 
21 Francisco Inácio Pinkusfeld Monteiro Bastos, “National Survey on 
Crack Usage: Who Are the Users of Crack And/Or Similars of Brazil? How 
Many in Brazilian Capitals?” (Rio de Janeiro: ICICT, 2014), 
https://www.arca.fiocruz.br/bitstream/icict/10019/2/UsoDeCrack.pdf. 
22 “Brazilian Drug Policy Platform,” accessed December 11, 2017, 
http://idpc.net/profile/brazilian-drug-policy-platform. 
23 Thiago Rodrigues and Beatriz Caiuby Labate, “Brazilian Drug Policy: 
Tension Between Repression and Alternatives,” SpringerLink, 2016, 187–
208, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29082-9_11. 
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the country move the debate forward, and cannabidiol was regulated 
in Brazil in 2015 by the National Health Surveillance Agency 
(ANVISA).24 A long discussion on decriminalization of illegal drugs 
in Brazil, by the Supreme Court, is still ongoing, based on an appeal 
taken to the court, and three out of 11 judges have voted for the 
decriminalization in that case—the remaining judges haven’t voted 
yet,25 while some of those who did, like Luis Roberto Barroso,26 have 
been advocating worldwide for the decriminalization of illegal drugs 
for personal use.27 Barroso has stated needs a new policy, to override 
the current “police, weapons, and numerous arrests” policy method 
that has failed.28 
                                                        
24 Jean Marcel Carvalho França, The history of marijuana in Brazil (São 
Paulo: Três Estrelas, 2015). 
25 Raphael Martins, “Score at STF Is at 3 X 0 for Drugs Decriminaliza-
tion,” Exame, August 2, 2017, https://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/placar-
no-stf-esta-em-3x0-para-descriminalizacao-de-drogas/. 
26 Felipe Rocondo, “Read the Vote of Judge Barroso on the Drugs Case 
- JOTA,” accessed December 12, 2017, https://www.jota.info/docs/leia-
o-voto-do-ministro-barroso-no-julgamento-das-drogas-10092015. 
27 Luís Roberto Barroso, “Brazil Must Legalise Drugs – Its Existing Pol-
icy Just Destroys Lives | Luís Roberto Barroso,” The Guardian, November 
15, 2017, sec. Global development, http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2017/nov/15/brazil-must-legalise-drugs-existing-policy-
destroys-lives-luis-roberto-barroso-supreme-court-judge. 
28 Luís Roberto Barroso, “Brazil Must Legalise Drugs – Its Existing Pol-
icy Just Destroys Lives | Luís Roberto Barroso,” The Guardian, November 




 “Open Arms” 
It’s under such a mixed debate that, in 2014, the first City Hall 
program on harm reduction aimed at solving São Paulo’s largest open 
drug scenes issues turned up, promoted by Fernando Haddad, the left-
wing politician from the Worker’s Party.29 The program was an 
attempt to rethink the latest repressive policies levied on Crackland 
by previous administrations of São Paulo’s City Hall, such as the 
“Operation Cleaning”, of 2005; “Operation Dignity”, of 2007; and 
“Operation Tightness” of 2012, all of them characterized by the use 
of force and repression against crack cocaine users in Crackland30; a 
policy that ended up decreasing the number of users in the place, but 
that would later either return to Crackland or spread across other 
central streets of the city.31 
Aimed at boosting society’s support to address the crack issue at 
Crackland, Open Arms offered beneficiaries a R$ 15-voucher (US$ 
4.57 in current value), a place for them to shelter at a nearby hotel, 
                                                        
29 “Report on the preliminary evaluation survey of the program ‘Open 
Arms’” (São Paulo: Brazilian Drug Policy Platform (PBPD)/ Brazilian In-
stitute of Criminal Sciences, 2016), http://pbpd.org.br/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/12/Pesquisa-De-Bra%C3%A7os-Abertos-1-2.pdf. 
30 “Report on the preliminary evaluation survey of the program ‘Open 
Arms’” (São Paulo: Brazilian Drug Policy Platform (PBPD)/ Brazilian In-
stitute of Criminal Sciences, 2016), http://pbpd.org.br/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/12/Pesquisa-De-Bra%C3%A7os-Abertos-1-2.pdf. 
31 Sam Cowie, “Inside Crackland: The Open-Air Drug Market That São 




and cleaning jobs.32 At the place, municipal police bases were set 
around the place.33   
The program, however, didn’t incorporate components such as 
crack use kits or drug dependency alternatives that were, for instance, 
adopted by other countries to deal with open drug scenes. Even so, 
owing to the huge step forward in Brazil’s drug policy history, Open 
Arms was welcomed by organizations that bet on harm reduction 
approaches.34 Two years after the program was launched, signs of 
success were seen. More than 500 crack users had a place to shelter, 
other 280 were waiting for new vacancies in the program, making it a 
reference at international level.35 
Things would change after the election of the new mayor, Pedro 
Doria, who took power in 2017. Despite the results of a survey 
conducted by the major Brazilian newspaper saying that 69% of the 
city’s population approved the Open Arms program (against 22% of 
the population that opposed it),36 Doria, reviving the previous 
repressive policies, declared war on Crackland and sent 900 police 
                                                        
32 São Paulo City Hall, “Open Arms Program” (São Paulo), accessed 
December 11, 2017, http://www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretar-
ias/upload/saude/DBAAGO2015.pdf. 
33 Marcelo Ribeiro et al., “The Brazilian ‘Cracolândia’ Open Drug Scene 
and the Challenge of Implementing a Comprehensive and Effective Drug 
Policy: Editorial,” Addiction 111, no. 4 (April 2016): 571–73, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/add.13151. 
34 Sarah Evans, “Crack: harm reduction” (São Paulo: Open Society 
Foundations, January 2017), https://www.opensocietyfounda-
tions.org/sites/default/files/crack-reduzir-danos-20170313.pdf. 
35 Sarah Evans, “Crack: harm reduction” (São Paulo: Open Society 
Foundations, January 2017), https://www.opensocietyfounda-
tions.org/sites/default/files/crack-reduzir-danos-20170313.pdf. 
36 “Program Aimed at Combating Crack at SP Is Supported by 69% of 




officers to dismantle it in May 2017.37 It did so after news came out 
stating that hotel’s facilities aimed at sheltering crack users had been 
taken over by drug traffickers.38 Soon after the crackdown, Crackland 
goes well39 and its population has returned and increased, as 
mentioned before. Doria didn’t stop there, and the policy is stumbling 
on inconsistencies. The hotel dedicated to sheltering drug users, a key 
component of the program, will be shut down by December of 2017.40 
Can “Open Arms” get better? 
Arguments saying that the policy is not working as a way of 
justifying a repressive setback shouldn’t be taken too seriously and 
don’t offer evidenced reasons for its termination. No such a program 
—aiming specifically at the crack cocaine users— would be perfect 
alone. A study that reviewed policies on open drug scenes in five 
European cities—Amsterdam, Vienna, Lisbon, Zürich, and Frankfurt, 
has concluded that the best way of handling the situation is to 
                                                        
37 Sam Cowie, “Inside Crackland: The Open-Air Drug Market That São 
Paulo Just Can’t Kick,” The Guardian, November 27, 2017, sec. Cities, 
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/nov/27/inside-crackland-
open-air-crack-market-sao-paulo. 
38 Juliana Gragnani, “Drug Street Fair at Crackland Becomes a Stale-
mate to Doria,” Folha de S.Paulo, accessed December 11, 2017, 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2017/04/1878466-feira-da-
droga-vira-impasse-para-programa-de-doria-na-cracolandia.shtml. 
39 Sam Cowie, “Inside Crackland: The Open-Air Drug Market That São 
Paulo Just Can’t Kick,” The Guardian, November 27, 2017, sec. Cities, 
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/nov/27/inside-crackland-
open-air-crack-market-sao-paulo. 
40 Sam Cowie, “Inside Crackland: The Open-Air Drug Market That São 




implement a holistic response: that involves not only law 
enforcement, but also prevention, and treatment of users in addition 
to harm reduction methods; none of these cities achieved their 
positive results only relying on treatment, medial, and social support 
(as it is the case in Crackland).41  
On one hand, it was only when the cities established a multi-sector 
approach, embedded in a comprehensive policy on drugs, that they 
could achieve coexistence between drug users and their neighbors.42 
At the same time, harm reduction could be achieved.43 
The same study mentioned above, however, points out that only 
when political forces mobilized at the local (managing the program) 
and national level (establishing a guidance that favored such policies) 
that positive results could be achieved. 
Besides that, another finding was crucial: long-term policies 
combining control and support to users and their neighbors around 
open drug scenes were set at the design stage, creating an 
understanding that no short-term program could be effective for 
obtaining positive results, let alone for providing enough information 
for proper evaluations.44 The key message found in the report was that 
changes in social, economic, and political thinking are necessary to 
take place for policies to work. A thing that requires long periods of 
time. If a multi-sector approach be incorporated in its guidance, Open 
                                                        
41 Helge Waal et al., “Open Drug Scenes: Responses of Five European 
Cities,” BMC Public Health 14 (August 16, 2014): 853, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-14-853. 
42 Helge Waal et al., “Open Drug Scenes: Responses of Five European 
Cities,” BMC Public Health 14 (August 16, 2014): 853, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-14-853. 
43 Helge Waal et al., “Open Drug Scenes: Responses of Five European 
Cities,” BMC Public Health 14 (August 16, 2014): 853, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-14-853. 
44 Helge Waal et al., “Open Drug Scenes: Responses of Five European 
Cities,” BMC Public Health 14 (August 16, 2014): 853, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-14-853. 
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Arms is likely to obtain better results for drug users and for those 
living in neighboring areas. But it can get even better.  
Instead of including only treatment and prevention, the City Hall 
should think of dependency as well. A more ambitious harm reduction 
policy could prevent crack cocaine doers from spreading contagious 
diseases, such as hepatitis C virus and HIV, according to a report that 
evaluated harm reduction policies in Toronto, Vancouver, Halifax, 
and other Canadian cities.45 The same report shows that these diseases 
were found among crack cocaine users in higher numbers than in the 
local population in these cities. Thus, as with needle exchange 
programs for heroin users, crack use kits aim at making crack usage 
less dangerous for users by offering mouthpieces, glass stems (that 
users can use as a pipe), brass screens (used to hold the crack “rock” 
when added to a pipe), in addition to other items such as condoms.46  
Therefore, not only does the method help prevent users from 
sharing infected pipes with other users, it does also work as a physical 
way of protecting users from acquiring burned lips, cuts, and oral 
sores.47 An evaluation report on the Ottawa experience has shown 
that, in a span of a year, risks associated to crack reduced owing to 
the distribution of crack use kits.48  
                                                        
45 “Distributing Safer  Crack Use Kits in Canada” (Canadian HIV/AIDS 
Legal Network, September 2008), http://librarypdf.catie.ca/PDF/ATI-
20000s/26038.pdf. 
46 “Distributing Safer  Crack Use Kits in Canada” (Canadian HIV/AIDS 
Legal Network, September 2008), http://librarypdf.catie.ca/PDF/ATI-
20000s/26038.pdf. 
47 S. Faruque et al., “Crack Cocaine Smoking and Oral Sores in Three 
Inner-City Neighborhoods,” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
dromes and Human Retrovirology: Official Publication of the Interna-
tional Retrovirology Association 13, no. 1 (September 1996): 87–92. 
48 Lynne Leonard, Emily DeRubeis, and Nicholas Birkett, “City of Ot-
tawa Public Health Safer Crack Use Initiative Evaluation Report” (Ot-
tawa: University of Ottawa, 2006), http://www.ohrdp.ca/wp-content/up-
loads/pdf/Final_Crack_Report_ES_f.pdf. 
16  
Even though more liberal in approach, such component can work 
as an effective ingredient in the current Open Arms structure. There 
shouldn’t be reasons for avoiding such step forward: The latest report 
on Crackland from 2017 has shown that such health issues are, 
evidently, not limited to Canadian crack users; hepatitis C, B, HIV, 
and other communicable diseases were also detected in higher 
numbers among users in Crackland.49 
A way to go 
The political shift with the ascension of Doria as the mayor of São 
Paulo represented a setback toward a catastrophic repressive method 
to address Crackland. The lack of political support to Open Arms and 
the termination of a component in it, as mentioned before, show a lack 
of understanding that policies involving crack take long periods of 
time to show results. Inconsistency is a mark of the current political 
approach in the region, making it difficult to evaluate results. 
On the other hand, the program itself should consider the dependency 
of crack users —by offering crack use kits— as a way of improving 
the program’s efficiency in the long run. The evidence makes obvious 
that a trimmed harm reduction project, combined with some 
communitarian and non-violent police and economic and social 
aspects altogether, may boost the chances of success, as elaborated 
before. 
If implemented and, over time, showing positive results, the program 
would help illuminate the current debate on Brazil’s drug policy, 
already divided between conservative and liberal forces. It could even 
support for the decriminalization of illegal drugs for personal use, in 
light of the Supreme Tribunal Court’s current debate on the matter; 
                                                        
49 Government of the State of São Paulo, ed., “Profile of drug users at 





let alone pushing for the approval of more liberal bills under 
discussion in the legislative power. 
As everything else—especially the repressive approach by the 
police— has failed, it’s time for policymakers to envision changes. 
However unlikely, if a new approach fails it would certainly not be as 
catastrophic as the current lost battle in Crackland, engaged by the use 




Barroso, Luís Roberto. “Brazil Must Legalise Drugs – Its Existing Policy Just Destroys Lives | 
Luís Roberto Barroso.” The Guardian, November 15, 2017, sec. Global development. 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/nov/15/brazil-must-legalise-drugs-ex-
isting-policy-destroys-lives-luis-roberto-barroso-supreme-court-judge. 
Bastos, Francisco Inácio Pinkusfeld Monteiro. “National Survey on Crack Usage: Who Are the 
Users of Crack And/Or Similars of Brazil? How Many in Brazilian Capitals?” Rio de Janeiro: 
ICICT, 2014. https://www.arca.fiocruz.br/bitstream/icict/10019/2/UsoDeCrack.pdf. 
Boiteux, Luciana. “Drugs and Prisons: The Repression of Drugs and the Increase of the Brazilian 
Penitentiary Population.” Systems Overload-Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America. Amster-
dam/Washington: Transnational Institute/Washington Office Latin America , 2011, 30–8. 
“Brazil - Overview of Drug Laws and Legislative Trends in Brazil.” TNI Drugs & Democracy 
programme. Accessed December 8, 2017. http://www.druglawreform.info/en/country-infor-
mation/latin-america/brazil/item/201-brazil. 
“Brazil must rethink its drugs policy. But how?” Politize! (blog), April 19, 2016. 
http://www.politize.com.br/repensando-a-politica-de-drogas-brasil/. 
“Brazilian Drug Policy Platform.” Accessed December 11, 2017. http://idpc.net/profile/brazilian-
drug-policy-platform.  
Caldas, Eline. “MJ releases new report on Brazilian prison’s population.” Multimid ia. Accessed 
December 10, 2017. http://www.justica.gov.br/radio/mj-divulga-novo-relatorio-sobre-popula-
cao-carceraria-brasileira. 
Chandler, River. “Best Practices for British Columbia’s Harm Reduction Supply Distribution Pro-
gram.” BC Harm Reduction Strategies and Services (BCHRSS) Committee, September 2008. 
http://www.bccdc.ca/resource-gallery/Documents/Guidelines%20and%20Forms/Guide-
lines%20and%20Manuals/Epid/Other/BestPractices.pdf. 
Cowie, Sam. “Inside Crackland: The Open-Air Drug Market That São Paulo Just Can’t Kick.” The 
Guardian, November 27, 2017, sec. Cities. http://www.theguardian.com/cit-
ies/2017/nov/27/inside-crackland-open-air-crack-market-sao-paulo. 
Crackland. June 9, 2017. Government of the State of São Paulo, São Paulo. In Government of the 
State of São Paulo. By Alexandre Carvalho / Government of the State of São Paulo. June 9, 
2017. Accessed December 12, 2017. http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/pesquisa -pio-
neira-revela-o-perfil-dos-frequentadores-da-cracolandia/. 
“Denarc presents assessment of megaoperation in Crackland.” Governo do Estado de São Paulo, 
May 23, 2017. http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/denarc-apresenta-balanco-da-
megaoperacao-realizada-na-cracolandia/. 
“Distributing Safer  Crack Use Kits in Canada.” Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, September 
2008. http://librarypdf.catie.ca/PDF/ATI-20000s/26038.pdf. 
Evans, Sarah. “Crack: harm reduction.” São Paulo: Open Society Foundations, January 2017. 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/crack-reduzir-danos-
20170313.pdf. 
Faruque, S., B. R. Edlin, C. B. McCoy, C. O. Word, S. A. Larsen, D. S. Schmid, J. C. Von Bargen, 
and Y. Serrano. “Crack Cocaine Smoking and Oral Sores in Three Inner-City Neighborhoods.” 
Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes and Human Retrovirology: Official Pub-
lication of the International Retrovirology Association 13, no. 1 (September 1996): 87–92. 
“‘Feira Da Droga’ Vira Impasse Para Programa de Doria Na Cracolândia - 26/04/2017 - Cotidi-
ano.” Folha de S.Paulo. Accessed December 11, 2017. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidi-
ano/2017/04/1878466-feira-da-droga-vira-impasse-para-programa-de-doria-na-cracolan-
dia.shtml. 
França, Jean Marcel Carvalho. The history of marijuana in Brazil. São Paulo: Três Estrelas, 2015. 
19 
Government of the State of São Paulo, ed. “Profile of drug users at Crackland.” Secretary of Social 
Development of the State of São Paulo, 2017. 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BzuqMfbpwX4wb3kyQzdwTlRrbHc/view. 
Gragnani, Juliana. “Drug Street Fair at Crackland Becomes a Stalemate to Doria.” Folha de 
S.Paulo. Accessed December 11, 2017. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidi-
ano/2017/04/1878466-feira-da-droga-vira-impasse-para-programa-de-doria-na-cracolan-
dia.shtml. 
Labate, Beatriz Caiuby, Clancy Cavnar, and Thiago Rodrigues, eds. Drug Policies and the Politics 
of Drugs in the Americas. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29082-9. 
Leonard, Lynne, Emily DeRubeis, and Nicholas Birkett. “City of Ottawa Public Health Safer 
Crack Use Initiative Evaluation Report.” Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2006. 
http://www.ohrdp.ca/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Final_Crack_Report_ES_f.pdf. 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Law on Drugs, Pub. L. No. 11.343, § 7o Art. 28 (2006). 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2006/lei/l11343.htm. 
Martins, Raphael. “Score at STF Is at 3 X 0 for Drugs Decriminalization.” Exame, August 2, 2017. 
https://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/placar-no-stf-esta-em-3x0-para-descriminalizacao-de-
drogas/. 
Miraglia, Paula. “Drugs and Drug Trafficking in Brazil: Trends and Policies.” Center for 21st 
Century Security and Intelligence, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/07/Miraglia-Brazil-final.pdf. 
Muñoz, César. “Ten Years of Drug Policy Failure in Brazil.” Human Rights Watch, August 28, 
2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/28/ten-years-drug-policy-failure-brazil. 
“New research shows Crackland frequenters’ profile.” Governo do Estado de São Paulo, June 9, 
2017. http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/pesquisa-pioneira-revela-o-perfil-dos-fre-
quentadores-da-cracolandia/. 
“Number of women at Crackland doubles in a year, shows research by the Sao Paulo state govern-
ment.” Accessed December 10, 2017. https://ponte.org/numero-de-mulheres-na-cracolandia-
dobra-em-um-ano-revela-pesquisa-do-governo-de-sp/. 
“OHCHR | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Accessed December 11, 2017. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx. 
Oliveira Carlos, Juliana de. “Drug Policy and Incarceration in São Paulo, Brazil.” International 
Drug Policy Consortium, June 2015. https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/idpc-
briefing-paper_drug-policy-in-brazil-2015.pdf. 
“Pesquisa Pioneira Revela Perfil Dos Frequentadores Da Cracolândia.” Governo do Estado de São 
Paulo, June 9, 2017. http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/pesquisa-pioneira-revela-o-per-
fil-dos-frequentadores-da-cracolandia/. 
“Principles of Drug Dependence Treatment.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008. 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-treatment/UNODC-WHO-Principles-of-Drug-
Dependence-Treatment-March08.pdf. 
“Program Aimed at Combating Crack at SP Is Supported by 69% of the Population.” Accessed 
December 11, 2017. http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/opiniaopublica/2016/07/1792846-pro-
grama-de-combate-ao-crack-no-centro-de-sp-tem-apoio-de-69.shtml. 
“Report on the preliminary evaluation survey of the program ‘Open Arms.’” São Paulo: Brazilian 
Drug Policy Platform (PBPD)/ Brazilian Institute of Criminal Sciences, 2016. 
http://pbpd.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Pesquisa-De-Bra%C3%A7os-Abertos-1-
2.pdf. 
“Research shows that Crackland’s population increased 160% in a year.” Estadão. Accessed De-
cember 10, 2017. http://sao-paulo.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,pesquisa-revela-que-popula-
cao-da-cracolandia-cresceu-160-em-um-ano,70001832252. 
Ribeiro, Marcelo, Sérgio Duailibi, Rosana Frajzinger, Ana Leonor Sala Alonso, Lucas Marchetti, 
Anna V. Williams, John Strang, and Ronaldo Laranjeira. “The Brazilian ‘Cracolândia’ Open 
Drug Scene and the Challenge of Implementing a Comprehensive and Effective Drug Policy: 
Editorial.” Addiction 111, no. 4 (April 2016): 571–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.13151. 
20  
Rocha, Filipe de Carlo Araújo. “Legalisation of Drugs: The Decriminalization and Regulation as 
a Way of Combating the Organized Crime,” 2016. 
Rocondo, Felipe. “Read the Vote of Judge Barroso on the Drugs Case - JOTA.” Accessed Decem-
ber 12, 2017. https://www.jota.info/docs/leia-o-voto-do-ministro-barroso-no-julgamento-das-
drogas-10092015. 
Rodrigues, Thiago, and Beatriz Caiuby Labate. “Brazilian Drug Policy: Tension Between Repres-
sion and Alternatives.” SpringerLink, 2016, 187–208. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
29082-9_11. 
São Paulo City Hall. “Open Arms Program.” São Paulo. Accessed December 11, 2017. 
http://www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretarias/upload/saude/DBAAGO2015.pdf. 
Souza, Jessé. Crack E Exclusão Social. Ministério da Justiça e Cidadania, 2016. 
Souza, Ricardo André, and Rodrigo Batista Pacheco. “The Tragedy of Failed Drug Policies in 
Brazil.” Open Society Foundations. Accessed December 8, 2017. https://www.opensocie-
tyfoundations.org/voices/tragedy-failed-drug-policies-brazil. 
Szabó, Ilona. “Drug Policy in Brazil: A Long-Overdue Discussion | Transform: Getting Drugs 
Under Control.” Accessed December 8, 2017. /blog/drug-policy-brazil-long-overdue-discus-
sion. 
Szabo, Ilona. “Where Is Brazil in the Global Drug Debate?” Huffington Post (blog), April 13, 
2012. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ilona-szabo/war-on-drugs-brazil_b_1423864.html. 
Waal, Helge, Thomas Clausen, Linn Gjersing, and Michael Gossop. “Open Drug Scenes: Re-
sponses of Five European Cities.” BMC Public Health 14 (August 16, 2014): 853. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-14-853. 







© Vinicius Gorczeski 
MTA Law Working Papers 
Kiadó: Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont 
Székhely: 1097 Budapest, Tóth Kálmán utca 4. 
Felelős kiadó: Boda Zsolt főigazgató 
Felelős szerkesztő: Körtvélyesi Zsolt 
Szerkesztőség: Hoffmann Tamás, Kecskés Gábor, 
Körtvélyesi Zsolt, Szilágyi Emese 
Honlap: http://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp 
E-mail: mta.law-wp@tk.mta.hu 
ISSN 2064-4515 
